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Abstract
We study a risk management problem in the scenario of ship procurement. A shipping
rm faces a certain nancing pressure for the procurement of a new ship. On the other
hand, the capacity of the ship excesses the demand requirement of the rm. The rm
wants to reduce the payment and control the risk by selling a percentage of capacity
to another shipping company. We introduce an auction mechanism for the rm to
select the partner and determine the sharing percentage. Acting as the auctioneer,
the rm announces a certain percentage of capacity to a set of buyers. The payment
from the buyer is determined as the highest bid level except the winning price in
a second-price auction. The bidding strategy depends on two signals: the demand
and nancial ction. For both the risk-neutral and risk-averse utility functions, we
nd the unique equilibrium for buyers, and the unique percentage of sharing capacity
for the auctioneer. Our new policy not only reduces the cost of nancial ction,
but also increases the overall utilization of ship capacity. The numerical experiments
illustrate that the percentage of the payments from auction is usually higher than the
percentage of the capacity shared to the partner. The rm improves the performance
signicantly through our auction mechanism.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem description
Investments and nancing are among the most important decisions in a rm's opera-
tions. Especially for those long-term capacity investments involve hudge expenditures,
the integrated optimal capacity planning and the nancing strategies for a risk-averse
nacially constrained decision maker are critical in the presence of uncertainty. Fi-
nancial resources are not free for rms. They need external funds to support the
investments. As a cost the nancing cost will be imposed in the form of interests,
etc. Usually the marginal nancing cost is increasing in scale of nancing due to
the increasing risk premium and other friction factors. Even the rm only use its
internal funds the expected marginal revenue will decrease in the amount of money
be invested. This have the same eect of the increasing nancing cost. Under this
scenario the rm need to nd an optimal strategy to balance the increasing nancing
cost and the benets from the investment in capacity decisions.
This paper is motivated by the real problem arises from the shipping business. We
study a risk management problem in the scenario of ship procurement. A shipping
1
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rm faces a certain nancing pressure for the procurement of a new ship. On the
other hand, the capacity of the ship excesses the demand requirement of the rm.
The rm wants to reduce the payment and control the risk by selling a percentage
of capacity to another shipping company. We introduce an auction mechanism for
the rm to select the partner and determine the sharing percentage. Acting as the
auctioneer, the rm announces a certain percentage x 2 [0; 1] of capacity to a set of
buyers. The buyers compete for the sharing percentage by submitting their bids that
indicate their willingness to pay. The payment from the buyer is determined as the
highest bid level except the winning price in a second-price auction.
Both the seller (the shipping rm) and buyers (potential partners) can benet
from the capacity-cost sharing scheme. From the buyer's perspective, the capacity-
cost sharing scheme oers an opportunity to expand its capacity to better meet its
demand for a reasonable price. If not sharing the capacity and cost with the seller, the
buyer may not be able to procure an appropriate vessel by its own. So that it could
lose the opportunity to make money. So the buyers have incentive to participate in
the capacity-cost sharing scheme.
The seller also benet from the capacity-cost sharing scheme. First, by adopting
the capacity-cost sharing scheme the seller can reduce its demand risk. The shipping
company's furture demand is random instead of deterministic. The stochastic uc-
tuation of the demands is a risk factor in the company's operation. For a risk-averse
decision maker it is reasonable to share parts of its capacity to cover its loss in case
of extreme low demand realization. Second, the seller can reduce its total cost. For a
nancially constrained shipping company facing increasing marginal cost on expen-
diture, the nancing cost will increase dramatically. By sharing parts of its capacity,
the seller can acquire the buyer's payment as a source of nancing which is free of in-
terest. This will reduce both purchasing cost and nancing cost for the seller. Third,
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the seller can make use of extra capacity. The shipping company's demand may be
lower than the total capacity of the ship with very high probability. In this case the
extra capacity is totally worthless for the company. The company can benet from
selling the capacity without any possible loss.
Besides the above benets for buyers and seller, the utilization of the vessel will
increase by sharing the capacity. This is the benet for the society.
We propose auction as the mechanism to select the partner as well as determine
the selling price in the capacity-cost sharing scheme. Auction is a kind of selling
mechanism which is broadly used in selling artworks, antiques, natural resources,
nancial instruments and etc. A of the good features of auction is the price discovering
function by increasing the competition among bidders to force them reveal their
private valuation of the item. Auction is an ideal mechanism for our capacity-cost
sharing scheme. The buyer who need the capacity share most can win the capacity
share by submitting the highest bid. And the seller of the capacity share can benet
from the competition imposed by auction. Even if the shipping company doesn't
adopt auction as the selling mechanism, as an analysis framework auction will oer
useful insights for the rm's pricing decision.
In this paper we assume that the seller will announce the capacity share to sell
in advance, then the buyers will compete by submitting bids for the capacity. We
will focus on the implementation of second-price sealed auction. However we build a
general model that is consistent with other forms of auctions in Chapter 2. We expect
to (i) study the optimal capacity decision for the seller and the bidding strategy for
buyers; and (ii) try to understand the role of demand and nancial friction in all
participants' decision making.
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1.2 Related literature
Three streams of literatures are related to our work. They are (i) researches on
capacity reservation studied by Wu et al. (2002) and Kleindorfer and Wu (2003); (2)
researches on auctions with constraints studied by Che and Gale (1998) and Malakhov
and Vohra (2009); and (iii) researched on auction application in procurement problem
studied by Dasgupta et al (1990), Che (1993), Branco (1997) and Chen (2007).
Table 1.1: Related literatures
Literature Mechanism Signal Space Risk Attitude
Wu et al. (2002) Not Specied - - Risk Neutral
Kleindorfer and Wu (2003) Not Specied - - Risk Neutral
Che and Gale (1998) Auction M C Risk Neutral
Malakhov and Vohra (2009) Auction M D Risk Neutral
Dasgupta et al (1990) Auction U C Risk Neutral
Che (1993) Auction U C Risk Neutral
Branco (1997) Auction U C Risk Neutral
Chen (2007) Auction U C Risk Neutral
Our Paper Auction M C Risk Averse
* M is for multi-dimensional. U is for uni-dimensional. C is for continuous. D is for
discrete.
Wu et al. (2002) studied the seller's optimal bidding strategy and the buyers'
contracting strategies for capital-intensive goods. In their model, the seller acts as
a Stackelberg leader who oered the capacity reserve cost and executive cost as the
bid, then the buyer determine the capacity reserve level according to its own interest.
Adopting this framework as the base case, Kleindorfer and Wu (2003) reviewed a lot
of literatures involves with the problem of optimal capacity reservation by dierent
contracting linked with B2B exchanges in capital-intensive industries. Our research is
distinguished with the above works. Wu et al. (2002) and Kleindorfer and Wu (2003)
presume relationship and changes have already determined by some price discovery
mechanism. They focused on the ecient integration of long-term and short-term
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contracting. In our paper we use proposed auction as the selling mechanism for
capacity-cost sharing. And try to address the benets of this scheme.
Che and Gale (1998) studied the performance of rst-price and second-price auc-
tions when bidders' nancial resources are costly. In their paper they presumed the
existence of the buyer's equilibrium for the dual-dimensional signal setting. However
they did not oer a methodology to characterize the equilibrium. In our paper we
derive the buyer's equilibrium strategy for the dual-dimensional signal setting under
second-price auction. This distinguishes our paper with theirs. Malakhov and Vohra
(2009) studied the optimal auction design problem for a seller facing a group of buyers
with two-dimensional private signal about the marginal valuation of the goods and
its capacity constraints. They presume the signals to be nite discrete. Under this
critical assumption they can implement linear programming for their problem. In
our paper we assume that the signals are continuous, thus their methodology will not
work.
Dasgupta et al (1990) is one of the earliest paper studied auction mechanism in
procurement problems. They proved that under certain conditions quantity auction
is the optimal mechanism for the buyer in the procurement problem. Our paper is dis-
tinct with Dasgupta et al (1990). In Dasgupta et al (1990) signals are uni-dimensional.
But in our paper signals have two dimensions. Che (1993) and Branco (1997) studied
the optimal auction design problems for which the bids have multi-dimensions. The
auctioneer evaluate the multidimensional bids by some scoring function designed for
its best interest. It's dierent from our paper. In our paper the buyer's signals are
dual-dimensional while the bids only have one dimension. One of our problem is to
derive a bid function for buyers that constitute an equilibrium. Chen (2007) studied
the supply contract auction.
Miller et al (2007) studied an auction mechanism in which all bidders' types
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are multidimensional. In mechanism design problems, type (or signal) refers to the
characters of the participators. In an auction, every bidder is privately informed
with its type, and other bidders' types are assumed to follow some distributions.
Bidders make decisions on bid according to its own type and the distribution of others'
types as the available information. In private value auction, types are assumed to
be unidimensional as the valuation of the product. But in some applications, it is
appropriate to assume the type to be a vector. In this paper, the authors proof the
existence of a revelation mechanism for multidimensional continuous type auctions
with interdependent valuations.
1.3 Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 present the framework of
the model for the seller's optimal capacity sharing decision and the buyer's incentive
compatible bidding strategy. Chapter 3 and follows with the model with second-
price auction implementation. The seller's decision and utility are compared with the
risk-neutral assumption and risk-averse assumption. Chapter 5 is the conclusion and
point the future research.
Chapter 2
The Model
In this chapter we construct models for buyer's problem and seller's problem. Some
assumptions are proposed and justied in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2 we develop a
model framework for general case which do not specify the rule of auction. Models
for second-price auction and rst-price auction are constructed in Section 2.3 and
Section 2.4 respectively.
2.1 Notation and Assumptions
We consider the problem faced by seller that must determine the portion x 2 [0; 1]
of capacity share to sell in the auction which refers to the seller's problem. And the
problem faced by buyers that must propose appropriate bids Y that best t their
private signals which refers to the buyer's problem. The seller act as an Stackelberg
leader who posts the capacity share to be sold rst, then the buyers bid for the posted
capacity share x.
Let N be the number of buyers and let the subscript i = 1; 2; : : : ; N denote
dierent buyers. The subscript i = 0 will used to denote the seller especially. We use
7
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Table 2.1: Notation
U() utility function
r revenue for the total capacity
x capacity share to be sold in auction
Y (x; d; ) bidding function or bidding level
C total cost for the vessel
di expected demand for buyer i (seller if i = 0)
i nancing friction for buyer i (seller if i = 0)
i stochastic noise with E[i] = 0
the subscript A = G;F; S to denote the types of auctions. For every buyer and seller,
its signal is assumed to be a dual-dimensional vector (d; )T . Here  is the nancial
friction which represent the participator's nancial condition by aect its nancing
cost. And d represent the participator's expected demand. Here we propose some
assumptions for our model.
Assumption 2.1. Signal is private informed for (di; i)
T ; i = 0; 1; : : : ; N .  and d
are independent with each other.
Assumption 2.1 is standard in private value auction literatures. Under this as-
sumption every buyer is privately informed with its own signal (d; )T . But other
buyers' signal (d0; 0)T are unknown random variables drawn from the same distribu-
tion. The private information assumption is a reasonable generalization of the real
world. Usually it is not possible for a company to know its competitors' information
exactly. But a distribution can be assigned to the signals due to some public apriori
information. We assume that the expected demand d and nancial friction  are
independent for computational simplicity. But in fact most results in this paper do
not rely on the independent assumption. Assume that di  iid Fd and i  iid F.
And supp(fd) = [d; d], supp(f) = [; ].
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Assumption 2.2. The demand of buyer i (the seller if i = 0) is Di = di + i,
i = 0; 1; : : : ; N . i  iid F are random noise with zero mean.
We can view Di as the total demand for i during the entire operational periods
of the vessel. So it is reasonable to assume  follows normal distribution by applying
the Law of Large Number. We make the iid assumption on the random noise for
simplicity. However in more general cases buyers' demand can be correlated. The
zero mean assumption for i is not necessary. But for simplicity we can add the
nonzero part of E[i] to di.
Assumption 2.3. If the payment size is z the nancing cost function is assumed to
be c(; z) = 
2
z2. And the payment function is a common knowledge among buyers
and the seller.
There are some reasons to adopt the nancing cost function in Assumption 2.3.
First, the partial derivative on z is positive increasing which represent the increasing
marginal property of the nancing cost. Second, the increasing rate of the marginal
nancing cost is constant which equals to the nancial friction . And lastly, the
marginal nancing cost equals to zero while it is evaluated at z = 0 which is consistent
with our heuristics. The assumed nancing cost function is the unique continuous
function that satisfy the above three conditions. By assuming the above nancing
cost function we can characterize the participants' nancial condition by a single
parameter . This will facilitate our analysis and give us useful insight on the role of
nancial friction.
To model the buyer's risk preferences we propose the following assumptions con-
cerning on the concavity of utility function.
Assumption 2.4. Both buyers and the seller are assumed to be risk-averse with the
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Figure 2.1: The Framework for Model
same utility function if not further explained. Thus we have U 0()  0 and U 00()  0.
Further we assume U()  0.
We assume the same utility function for both buyers and seller to simplify the
model. We care about the eects of risk-aversion in general form so we do not assume
the specic utility function. Only the up-to the second order analytic properties are
assumed for the utility function.
2.2 Model Framework
Figure 2.1 illustrates the framework for our model. The seller acts as the Stackelberger
leader and buyers make their decisions based on the seller's posted capacity share x.
For any predetermined posted capacity share x every buyer need to submits a bid
Y that indicates how much he is willing to pay for x. This bid should best t the
buyer's interests that can maximizes his expected utility. The buyer's problem (BP) is
to nd out the optimal bid level Y according to its own signal (d; )T and the seller's
posted capacity share x. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is an appropriate concept for the
solution of BP as a game. A Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium is the state that everyone
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in the game is not incent to change its decision as long as other players keep their
decisions unchanged. For a buyer the Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium bidding function Y
is a function which maps the buyer's own signal (d; )T to the deterministic bid level
Y (x; d; ) for any predetermined capacity share x. But from other buyers' and the
seller's point of view, a given buyer's bid level is a random function of x due to the
randomness of the buyer's signal (d; )T . The seller's problem (SP) is to select an
optimal capacity share x for the auction according to the equilibrium among buyers,
which will maximize its expected utility. Here we will rst model the Buyer's Problem
and then the Seller's Problem assuming the existence of the equilibrium. However it
will be proved in section 3.3 that the equilibrium exist in the second-price auction for
both risk-neutral and risk-averse cases.
To analyze the buyer's problem we assume that the posted capacity share x to be
sold and the type of auction to be conducted were given. Here we rst formulate the
model for the general auction type A = G. The buyer's objective is to maximize its
expected utility by choosing an appropriate bid level Y . Without loss of generality
let's assume the buyer under our consideration is buyer i; i = 1; 2; : : : ; N . A charac-
teristic function 1G(yi; y i) is dened to tell whether buyer i win the auction or not if
his bid is yi and other bidder's bids are y i. 1G(yi; y i) equals to 1 if i wins according
to the rule of auction G, and it equals to 0 if i lost in the auction. The functional form
of 1G(yi; y i) is determined by the type of auction to be conducted. Examples of the
characteristic function for second-price and rst-price auction will be provided in the
later part of this section. Assume that i's bid is yi and others' bid are y i, if i win the
auction in the end his prot is i = rmin(x; di + i)  i2 P 2G(yi; y i)  PG(yi; y i) and
the utility for i is U(
B
i ) = U
 
rmin(x; di + i)  i2 P 2G(yi; y i)  PG(yi; y i)

. Here
rmin(x; di+i) is the operations revenue of the share capacity x if the realized demand
for i is di + i, and the second term
i
2
P 2G(yi; y i) is the nancing cost for i if his bid
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level is yi. PG(yi; y i) is the payment function which indicate the amount of payment
under the rule of auction G for the bidder if the outcome of the auction is (yi; y i) and
he wins the auction. In case that i lost the auction his prot is Bi = 0 and the utility
is U(0). So if given the outcome of the auction as (yi; y i) the buyer i's utility is
U
 
rmin(x; di + i)  i2 P 2G(yi; y i)  PG(yi; y i)

1G(yi; y i) + U(0) (1  1G(yi; y i)).
According to the above analysis we can formulate the buyer's problem as bellow.
(BP-G) max E

U
 
Bi

1G(yi; y i)

+ U(0)E [(1  1G(yi; y i))]
s:t: Bi = rmin(x; di + i)  i2 P 2G(yi; y i)  PG(yi; y i)
yi  0
(2.1)
Notice that in (BP-G), we can calculate the expectations in the objective function
by taking conditions on the value of the random function 1G(yi; y i). Since 1G(yi; y i)
is a characteristic function, its expectation is the winning probability GG(yi) for the
seller. So the buyer's problem (BP) can be transformed to the formulation bellow.
(BP-G0) max E

U
 
Bi

GG(yi) + U(0) [1 GG(yi)]
s:t: Bi = rmin(x; di + i)  i2 P 2G(yi; y i)  PG(yi; y i)
yi  0
(2.2)
Here we assumed the existence of equilibrium bidding strategy Y for the buyers
in advance. The equilibrium bidding strategy Y will map all the buyers' signals into
bid level y. So if the equilibrium bidding strategy exist there will be a CDF FY (y)
for bid level y which is consistent with the equilibrium. The winning probability GG
is determined by FY . Our approach is to rst assume the winning probability GG so
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the buyer's problem can be formulated as the individual optimization problem (BP-
G0).Then we will verify the existence of the equilibrium and further characterize the
winning probability GG.
The solution of (BP-G0) is an incentive compatible bidding strategy Y EQ(x; d; )
which is considered to be common knowledge among buyers and seller. For the seller,
there're two sources of revenue. They're revenue from its operations of the reserved
capacity 1 x and the revenue from the capacity share x that is sold in auction. The
seller's operational revenue OR(x; 0) is determined by its reserved capacity x and
its demand while the auction revenue AR(x; d; ) depends on the buyer's equilibrium
and the distribution of their signals. For the cost side, there're two terms which
are nancing cost and purchasing cost. The purchasing cost is the total price for the
vessel C. And the nancing cost FC(x; d; ) depends on the buyer's payments. Notice
that the nancing cost can be 0 if the buyer's payments is equal or greater than the
purchasing cost C in which case the seller need not seek for the costly funding.
The seller's problem (SP-G) for general auctions is formulated bellow.
(SP-G) max E [U (OR(x; 0) + AR(x; d; )  FC(x; d; )  C)]
s:t: OR(x; 0) = rmin(1  x; d+ 0)
AR(x; d; ) = HG

Y EQ1 ; Y
EQ
2 ; : : : ; Y
EQ
N

FC(x; d; ) = 0
2
E

C  HG

Y EQ1 ; Y
EQ
2 ; : : : ; Y
EQ
N
+2
x 2 [0; 1]
(2.3)
Here HG

Y EQ1 ; Y
EQ
2 ; : : : ; Y
EQ
N

is a function determined by the type of auction
to be conducted which indicate the revenue for the auctioneer if the outcome of the
auction is

Y EQ1 ; Y
EQ
2 ; : : : ; Y
EQ
N

.
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2.3 Second-Price Sealed Auction
If second-price auction is conducted, the buyer with the highest bid will win but
only need to pay the second highest bid. The payment function for the second-price
auction is dened as PS(yi; y i) = max fyj : 8j 6= ig and HS

Y EQ1 ; Y
EQ
2 ; : : : ; Y
EQ
N

=
Y EQ(N 1)(x; d; ). Suppose the winning probability for any buyer is GS(y) which equals
to FN 1Y (y) in this case. By conditioning we can simplify the expected utility in (BP-
G) which results in the following formulation for the buyer's problem for second-price
sealed auction implemented case (BP-S).
(BP-S) max E

U
 
Bi
 jZ < yGS(y) + U(0) (1 GS(y))
s:t: Bi = rmin(x; di + i)  i2 Z2   Z
Z = max fyj : 8j 6= ig
yi  0
(2.4)
Suppose the equilibrium bidding function for buyers is Y EQ then the seller's prob-
lem (SP-S) can be formulated as follows.
(SP-S) max E [U (OR(x; 0) + AR(x; d; )  FC(x; d; )  C)]
s:t: OR(x; 0) = rmin(1  x; d+ 0)
AR(x; d; ) = Y EQ(N 1)(x; d; )
FC(x; d; ) = 0
2
E

C   Y EQ(N 1)(x; d; )
+2
x 2 [0; 1]
(2.5)
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2.4 First-Price Sealed Auction
If rst-price auction is conducted, the buyer with the highest bid will win and pay
what her bid. The payment function for the second-price auction is dened as
PS(yi; y i) = yi and HS

Y EQ1 ; Y
EQ
2 ; : : : ; Y
EQ
N

= Y EQ(N) (x; d; ). Suppose the winning
probability for any buyer is GF (y) which equals to F
N
Y (y) in this case. By condi-
tioning we can simplify the expected utility in (BP-F) which results in the following
formulation for the buyer's problem for second-price sealed auction implemented case
(BP-F).
(BP-F) max E

U
 
Bi

GF (y) + U(0) (1 GF (y))
s:t: Bi = rmin(x; di + i)  i2 y2i   yi
yi  0
(2.6)
Suppose the equilibrium bidding function for buyers is Y EQ then the seller's prob-
lem (SP-F) is as follows.
(SP-F) max E [U (OR(x; 0) + AR(x; d; )  FC(x; d; )  C)]
s:t: OR(x; 0) = rmin(1  x; d+ 0)
AR(x; d; ) = Y EQ(N) (x; d; )
FC(x; d; ) = 0
2
E

C   Y EQ(N) (x; d; )
+2
x 2 [0; 1]
(2.7)
Chapter 3
Implement with Second Price
Sealed Auction
In this chapter we will focus on the case that the second-price sealed auction is
implemented. We'll rst solve both buyer's problem and seller's problem for the risk-
neutral case for which both buyers and the seller are assumed to be risk-neutral. And
then all results will be extend to the risk-averse case. The proofs of statements are
attached in Section 3.3.
3.1 Risk-Neutral Case
By replacing the concave utility function with a homogeneous linear function we get
the modied objective function for the risk-neutral buyer's problem for the second-
price auction (RN-BP-S).
16
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(RN-BP-S) max E

rE(x; di)  i2 Z2   ZjZ < y

GS(y)
s:t: Z = max fyj : 8j 6= ig
yi  0
(3.1)
An observation of the buyer's objective function is that by increasing the bid
level y the buyer's conditional expected prot will decrease but at the same time the
winning probability GS(y) will increase. So The buyer need to nd a bid level that can
balance these two mutual contradict eects. Proposition 3.1 gives the Bayesian-Nash
Equilibrium for the buyer's problem (RN-BP-S).
Proposition 3.1. The Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium bidding function Y EQS (x; ; d) for
(RN-BP-S) is the solution of the equation bellow.
rE(x; d)  
2
y2   y = 0 (3.2)
Thus we have,
Y EQS (x; ; d) =
p
1 + 2rE(x; d)  1

(3.3)
From Proposition 3.1 we know that if the second-price auction is conducted the
equilibrium strategy for buyers is bid to the maximum level that makes their expected
prot non-negative. This proposition is consist with the classic results about second-
price auction. To understand the equilibrium we consider the example bellow. As-
sume outcome suggested by the equilibrium is (yEQ1 ; y
EQ
2 ; : : : ; y
EQ
N ) we claim that for a
bidder (let's say bidder 1) it's optimal to keep its bid level unchanged if other bidders
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did not change their bids. Let's assume yEQ1 = max(y
EQ
1 ; y
EQ
2 ; : : : ; y
EQ
N ). In this case
bidder 1 will win the auction and his expected prot will be yEQ1  max(yEQi ; i 6= 1) >
0. It is not optimal for bidder 1 to increase the bid because no incremental expected
prot is induced by doing so. Decreasing the bid level is not optimal either. Because
the winning probability will decrease while the expected prot will not increase if bid-
der 1 win the auction in the end. For the case that yEQ1 < max(y
EQ
1 ; y
EQ
2 ; : : : ; y
EQ
N ) it
is not optimal to decrease the bid level because the bidder will still lost the auction
and the expected prot remains 0. Increasing the bid level is not optimal either.
This is because nothing changed if the increased bid level is still lower than the win-
ning bid, but if the increased bid level exceeded the former winning bid the bidder's
expected prot will become negative which is even worse than before.
We can characterize the iso-bid curve since we know the equilibrium bidding func-
tion. Iso-bid curve is a curve that divide the entire signal plane into two parts. The
signals on the same iso-bid curve share the same bid level. The signals laid on the
upper-left area of an iso-bid curve are associated with lower bid levels, while the
signals laid on the lower-right area of the iso-bid curve are associated with higher
bid levels. The next corollary gives the formulation of the iso-bid function for the
second-price auction case.
Corollary 3.1. The iso-bid function for any bidder is given by the equation bellow.
A(d; x; y) = 2r
y2
E(x; d)  1
y
(3.4)
Figure 3.1 illustrates the shape of buyer's equilibrium bid function Y EQS (x; ; d)
and the corresponding iso-bid curves. The sharp of Y EQS (x; ; d) are displayed in
subgure (a) and subgure (b) while the shape of A(d; x; y) are displayed in subgure
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Figure 3.1: The Equilibrium bid function
(c) and subgure (d). We performed two numerical experiments with dierent posted
capacity share x to see the eects of x on the bid level and the iso-bid curve. For the
low capacity share case x is set to be 0:3, and it is set to be 0:6 for the high capacity
share case. Other parameters for this numerical experiment are  = 0:01,  = 5,
d = 0:2, d = 0:7, r = 1:5 and C = 1. All these parameters are used in the followed
numerical experiments if not further explained.
We can observe from Figure 3.1 (a) (b) that the equilibrium bid function Y EQS is
increasing in the buyer's expected demand while decreasing in the nancial friction
. Buyers need to consider both demand factor and nancial factor in their bidding
decisions. With the same demand the buyer can bid more aggressively if his nancial
condition is better. While if the nancial conditions are similar, the buyer will bid
more if his expected demand is higher. These trends are more obvious when the
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capacity share x is high.
As observed in subgure (c) and subgure (d) the iso-bid curve is concave. Every
iso-bid curve is attached with a bid level. All signals laid on the same iso-bid curve
are assigned to the same equilibrium bid level. The iso-bid curves on the northwest
corner are associated with lower equilibrium bid level while the iso-bid curves on the
southeast corner are associated with higher equilibrium bid level. To attain a bid
level y the buyer's expected demand must increase if his nancial condition become
worse. When the bid level y is low the nancial friction  and expected demand d
will move in a linear manner. However when the bid level y become higher and higher
a small shift of nancial friction  will cause a large change in expected demand to
retain the bid level.
We can use iso-bid curves to derive the winning probability that is consistent with
the equilibrium bidding function in Proposition 3.1. The next corollary characterizes
the winning probability.
Corollary 3.2. Suppose N buyers are participating in the auction. Buyers' signals
are independent identical distributed with probability density function f(a) and fd(d)
then the winning probability is,
GS(y) = F
N 1
S (y) (3.5)
Where FS(y) is the cumulative distribute function for bid level Y
EQ
S .
FS(y) =
Z Z


f(a)fd()dad (3.6)
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Figure 3.2: Winning Probability

y =

(a; ) 2 [; ] [d; d] :   A(d; x; y)	 (3.7)

y is the area with signals which are associated with bid levels lower than y. By
taking integral on this area we obtain the CDF FY for the equilibrium bid level which
is consistent with Proposition 3.1.
Figure 3.2 plots the buyer's winning probability. Subgure (a) and subgure (b)
are the buyer's winning probability for Low capacity share case and high capacity
share case. In each case we plot the winning probability for N = 2, N = 4, N = 6,
N = 8 and N = 10. When the number of buyer is small the winning bid is more
evenly distributed. When the number of buyers increased the density of winning bid
will convergent to a higher level very fast. So if there're enough buyers the seller
get very good chance to sell the capacity share for a high price. This is a benet of
auction for the seller. Another observation between (a) and (b) in Figure 3.2 is that
by increasing x the upper bound for the winning bid will increase. This is the benet
from the increasing competition.
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Next we will move to the solution of the seller's problem (RN-SP-S) for second-
price auction. For the risk-neutral seller the objective is to maximize the expected
prot which is consist of the expected operational revenue (EOR), the expected auc-
tion revenue (EAR), the expected nancing cost (EFC) and the purchasing cost C.
The decision variable for the seller is the capacity share x.
(RN-SP-S) max EOR(x) + EAR(x)  EFC(x)  C
s:t: EOR(x) = rE(1  x; d0)
EAR(x) = E
h
Y EQ(N 1)(x; ; d)
i
EFC(x) = 0
2
E

C   Y EQ(N 1)(x; ; d)
+2
x 2 [0; 1]
(3.8)
We will study the seller's expected prot term by term. The next proposition is
about the concavity of the seller's expected operational revenue EOR(x) as a functions
of the capacity share x.
Proposition 3.2. Then seller's expected operational revenue EOR(x) is concave de-
creasing in the capacity share x.
The marginal expected operational revenue for the seller equals to  rPr(0 >
1   x   d0) which is the production of the revenue for the total capacity share  r
and the probability that the realized demand is greater than the reserved capacity
1  x. It is clear that the probability of the even that the realized demand is greater
than 1   x is increasing in the posted capacity share x. So the marginal expected
operational revenue is decreasing concave in x. Following the same logic we know
that the expected operational revenue is increasing concave in the seller's expected
demand d0. Figure 3.3 illustrates our observations in a more intuitive way. The
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Figure 3.3: Expected Operational Revenue
surface in the gure is the seller's operational revenue. We can observe that for any
capacity share x, the operational revenue is increasing in the d when d is less than
1   x. But when b become greater than 1   x there is only very little increases in
revenue if the d is increasing. So without considering the nancial friction select the
reservation capacity 1   x to fulll the expected demand is a good strategy for the
seller's capacity decision. However in the presence of nancial friction this strategy
is not optimal. We will illustrate this point in Chapter 4.
The seller's expected auction revenue EAR(x) and expected nancing cost EFC(x)
depend on the winning buyer's payment which equals to the second highest bid among
all buyers. Next we rst establish the concavity of the equilibrium bid function as
a function of the capacity share x. Later we will nd that the concavity of the bid
function is a sucient condition for the concavity of EAR(x) and  EFC(x).
Proposition 3.3. If second-price sealed auction is conducted, the buyer's equilibrium
bid function Y EQS (x; ; d) is concave increasing in x for all signals.
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However Proposition 3.3 can not guarantee the path-wise concavity of the (N  
1) th order statistic Y EQ(N 1)(x; ; d). In fact it is not dicult to construct counter
examples to prove that the (N   1) th order statistic is not concave in general case.
But we can prove expectation of Y EQ(N 1) is concave in x. The idea is that for any x
we can order Y EQi ; i = 1; 2; : : : ; N strictly with probability 1 in a neighborhood of x.
The order is disrupted with probability 0 which can be omitted while taking expec-
tation. First we present two lemmas which deal with the probabilistic property of
the equilibrium bid function Y EQ(N 1)(x; ; d) and the continuity of the iso-bid function
A(d; x; y) respectively.
Lemma 3.1. For any given capacity share x, Pr(Yi = Yj;8i 6= j) = 0.
Lemma 3.1 claims that x x the probability that any two bids from dierent
buyers equals is zero. Since the d and  are continuous random variables, the even
that any two bids equals is a countable subset of the probability space. Thus the
probability is zero.
Lemma 3.2. Fix the expected demand d, as a function of (x; y) the iso-bid function
A(d;x; y) is continuous.
With the continuity, there exist a neighborhood for every x in which the order of
bids reserved. Together with Lemma 3.1 we can prove the concavity of the winning
buyer's expected payment for second price auction which is the key to prove the
concavity of EAR(x) and  EFC(x).
Proposition 3.4. Dened the Expected Auction Revenue EAR(x) and the Expected
Financing Cost EFC(x) by the following equations.
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EAR(x) = E
h
Y EQ(N 1)(x; ; d)
i
(3.9)
EFC(x) =
0
2
E

C   Y EQ(N 1)(x; ; d)
+2
(3.10)
For any x0 2 [0; 1] there exist a  > 0 that
1. EAR(x) is concave increasing in x, 8x 2 (x0; x0 +);
2. EFC(x) is convex decreasing in x, 8x 2 (x0; x0 +).
The idea of Proposition 3.4 is that we can prove EAR(x) (EFC(x)) is pointwise
concave (convex) in the interval x 2 [0; 1]. This implies that EAR(x) (EFC(x)) is
concave (convex) in [0; 1]. We take the advantage of the continuity of A(d; x; y) in
Lemma 3.2. For a sample path we assume that all bids at x can be ranked strictly.
Due to the continuity of A(d; x; y) this rank will not be destroyed in a neighborhood
of x. Since we know that the equilibrium bid function is concave increasing in x from
Proposition 3.3 EAR(x) (EFC(x)) is concave (convex) in this neighborhood. This
local concavity (convexity) is valid for any sample with positive probability because
of Lemma 3.1. So the concavity of EAR(x) and the convexity of EFC(x) are proved.
Figure 3.4 illustrate the shape of the seller's expected auction revenue against the
capacity share x. When capacity is sold the seller can get more revenue from the
auction. If there are more buyers participate in the auction the auction revenue for
the seller will be higher. This phenomenon is shaper if the capacity share x is big.
Figure 3.5 displays the buyer's expected nancing cost against his nancial friction
 and the decision on capacity share x. Generally the expected nancing cost is
increasing with the nancial friction. If the nancial condition for the seller is bad
he may need to pay plenty of nancing cost to support his purchasing plan. However
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Figure 3.4: Expected Auction Revenue
as it is illustrated in Figure 3.5 the seller can ease his nancial pressure by selling
more capacity. As x increased, the seller can collect more money from the winning
buyer's payment as a interest-free fund. So he doesn't need to procure as much fund
as before. The expected nancing cost will be reduced dramatically especially for the
seller with poor nancial condition.
Proposition 3.4 together with Proposition 3.2 imply the existence and uniqueness
of the optimal posted capacity share to be sold xopt for the seller. The following
theorem gives the solution for this optimal capacity decision.
Theorem 3.1. The optimal posted capacity share decision xopt is uniquely exist for
the risk-neutral seller if the buyer's equilibrium bid function Y EQS (x; ; d) is concave
increasing in x. xopt is the solution of the equation bellow.
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rPr (0 > 1  x  d0) =
d

E
h
Y EQ(N 1)(x)
i
dx
  0
2
d
 
E

C   Y EQ(N 1)(x)
+2!
dx
(3.11)
The next proposition provides the relationship between the optimal capacity share
xopt and the seller's signal (0; d0).
Proposition 3.5. The seller's optimal capacity share to be sold xopt is decreasing in
the seller's expected demand d0 while increasing in the seller's nancial friction 0.
If the seller's expected demand d0 is increasing it is more likely that he will have
a higher realized demand. Thus he is incented to reserve more capacity to fulll his
future demands which will lead to more revenue. This will result in a shrinkage in
the optimal capacity share xopt. But if the seller's nancing friction 0 is increasing
the seller's relative advantage in nancing will decrease. It is better for the seller to
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Figure 3.6: Seller's Optimal Capacity Decision
put more capacity share to sale as a way to release the nancial pressure even his
expected demand is relative high. The capacity-cost sharing scheme and the auction
mechanism oer better chance for the seller to optimize its capacity and nancing
decisions.
3.2 Risk-Aversion
In this section we will focus our attentions on risk-averse cases. All the results in
Section3.1 to risk-averse cases. First we develop a proposition about the buyer's
problem (BP-S) in Equation (2.4).
Proposition 3.6. U() is a concave increasing utility function. The buyer's Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium bid function Y EQS (x; ; d) is the solution of the equation bellow.
E
h
U

rmin(x; d+ )  
2
y2   y
i
= U(0) (3.12)
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The result is similar to the risk-neutral case in Section 3.1. The equilibrium
bidding strategy requires the expected utility equals to U(0). Due to the concavity
of U() it's easy to know that if the buyer is risk averse the bid level y will be less
than the risk-neutral case.
The next proposition is about the concavity of Y EQS (x; ; d) as a function of the
capacity share x.
Proposition 3.7. Fix any signal (; d), the equilibrium bidding function Y EQS (x; ; d)
for (BP-S) is concave increasing in the capacity share x.
The concavity is reserved for the equilibrium bid function Y EQS (x; ; d) in the
case that the buyers are risk-averse. This is result of monotonicity of the utility
function U(). In the next theorem we will nd that the concavity of Y EQS (x; ; d) is
a sucient condition for the existence and the uniqueness of optimal capacity share
xopt for risk-averse seller.
Theorem 3.2. The optimal posted capacity share decision xopt is uniquely exist for
the risk-averse seller if the buyer's equilibrium bid function Y EQS (x; ; d) is concave
increasing in x. xopt is the solution for the rst order condition.
Similar results about the relationship between the optimal capacity share xopt and
the buyer's signal (0; d0) can be derived for risk-averse seller.
Proposition 3.8. The seller's optimal capacity share to be sold xopt is decreasing in
the seller's expected demand d0 while increasing in the seller's nancial friction 0.
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3.3 Proof of Statements
3.3.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1.
The expected prot for the buyer for bidding y is
S(y) =

rE(x; d)  E
h
2
z2 + z
z < yiGS(y) (3.13)
Set the rst order derivative equals to zero. We get the equation bellow.

rE(x; d)  
2
y2   y

G0S(y) = 0 (3.14)
=)
rE(x; d)  
2
y2   y = 0 (3.15)
So the bid function is
Y EQS (x; ; d) =
p
1 + 2rE(x; d)  1

(3.16)
This proved Proposition 3.1.
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3.3.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2.
EOR(x) = E0 [rmin(1  x; d0 + 0)] (3.17)
By taking derivative of EOR(x) we have.
dEOR(x)
dx
=  rPr(0 > 1  x  d0)  0 (3.18)
d2EOR(x)
dx2
=  rf0(1  x  d0)  0 (3.19)
This proved Proposition 3.2.
3.3.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3.
Choose an arbitrary pair of signal from the sample space, keep it xed. Without
loss of generality let's assume the signal is (; d). By taking derivatives we have the
following equations which proved E(x; d) is concave increasing in x.
8><>: E
0
1(x; d) = F(x  d)
E11
00(x; d) =  f(x  d)
(3.20)
Due to the monotonicity of Y EQS (x; ; d) on E(x; d), Y
EQ
S (x; ; d) is concave in-
creasing in x. Since (; d) is arbitrarily selected Proposition 3.3 is proved.
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3.3.4 Proof of Lemma 3.1.
Pr(Yi = YjjYj = t) =
ZZ
(a;)2f(a;):a=A(;x;t)g
f(a)fd()dad = 0
(3.21)
=)
Pr(Yi = Yj) =
Z U(x)
L(x)
Pr(Yi = YjjYj = t)fYj(t)dt = 0 (3.22)
This proved Lemma 3.1.
3.3.5 Proof of Proposition 3.4.
8x0 2 [0; 1], let D = [d; d], A = [; ]. Dene
I =
nN 1Y
i=1
(i; di) 2
N 1Y
i=1
(AD) : 9i 6= j; Yi(i; di;x) = Yj(j; dj;x)
o
(3.23)
1. 8QN 1i=1 (i; di) 2 Ic
Without lose of generality assume that
Y1 < Y2 <    < YN 1 < YN (3.24)
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8Yi < Yi+k, 9Y that Yi < Y < Yi+k. And
8><>: A(di;x; Y ) < iA(di+k;x; Y ) > i+k (3.25)
Denote r1 = i A(di;x; Y ) and r2 = A(di+k;x; Y ) i+k. Due to the continuous
of iso-bid function (refers to Lemma ??). There exist 1 and 2 that
8(x^1; y^1) 2

(x^; y^) : k(x^; y^)  (x; Y )k2 < 1
	
we have A(di; x^1; y^1) < i;
8(x^2; y^2) 2

(x^; y^) : k(x^; y^)  (x; Y )k2 < 2
	
we have A(di+k; x^2; y^2) < i;
Let  = min(1; 2), 9 > 0 that
(x + ; y) 2 (x^; y^) : k(x^; y^)   (x; Y )k2 < 2	, which satisfy the following
equations.
8><>: A(di;x+; y) < iA(di+k;x+; y) < i+k (3.26)
This means for all x 2 (x0; x0 + ), Yi(x) < Yi+k(x) if Yi(x0) < Yi+k(x0). So
Y(N 1)(x) = YN 1(x), 8x 2 (x0; x0 +).
Since YN 1(x) is concave increasing in x for all
QN 1
i=1 (i; di) 2 Ic. We have
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EAR(x) = E

Y(N 1)

= E
h
Y(N 1)
N 1Y
i=1
(i; di) 2 Ic
i
Pr
N 1Y
i=1
(i; di) 2 Ic

+E
h
Y(N 1)
N 1Y
i=1
(i; di) 2 I
i
Pr
N 1Y
i=1
(i; di) 2 I

= E
h
Y(N 1)
N 1Y
i=1
(i; di) 2 Ic
i
(3.27)
Which is concave increasing in x, 8x 2 [x0; x0 +].
2. Since
h 
C  Yi(x)
+i2
is convex decreasing in x, 8x 2 [0; 1], for the same reason
presented in the prove of (1) we can prove (2).
This proved Proposition 3.4.
3.3.6 Proof of Theorem 3.1.
Since EOR(x) and EAR(x) are concave increasing in x and EFC(x) is convex de-
creasing in x, the seller's objective function is concave increasing in x. So the seller's
problem has unique optimal solution. The solution is determined by the rst order
condition which is presented as bellow.
rPr (0 > 1  x  d0) =
d

E
h
Y EQ(N 1)(x)
i
dx
  0
2
d
 
E

C   Y EQ(N 1)(x)
+2!
dx
(3.28)
This proved Theorem 3.1.
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3.3.7 Proof of Proposition 3.5.
Dene H(x; ; d) as followed.
H(x; ; d) =
r@E(1  x; d0)
@x
+
@ (EAR(x))
@x
  0
2
@
 
E

C   Y EQ(N 1)(x)
+2!
@x
(3.29)
@H
@xopt
=
d2EOR(x)
dx2
+
d2EAR(x)
dx2
  d
2EFC(x)
dx2
 0 (3.30)
@H
@0
=   1
0
dEFC(x)
dx
 0 (3.31)
@H
@d0
=  rf0(1  x  d0)  0 (3.32)
So the partial derivatives of xopt are as followed.
@xopt
@0
=  
@H
@0
@H
@xopt
 0 (3.33)
@xopt
@d0
=  
@H
@d0
@H
@xopt
 0 (3.34)
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These proved Proposition 3.5.
3.3.8 Proof of Proposition 3.6.
Since  is independent with Yi, 8i.
E [U ((x; ; d; Z; )) jZ < y] = EZ [E [U ((x; ; d; Z; ))] jZ < y] (3.35)
We have
E [U ((x; ; d; Z; )) jZ < y]GS(y) =
Z y
0
E [U ((x; ; d; t; ))]G
0
S(t)dt
(3.36)
Taking the derivative of the buyer's expected prot refers to the bid level y results
the following equation.
E [U ((x; ; d; y; ))]G
0
S(y)  U(0)G0S(y) = 0 (3.37)
So we have
E [U ((x; ; d; y; ))] = U(0) (3.38)
=)
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E
h
U

rmin(x; d+ )  
2
y2   y
i
= U(0) (3.39)
Which proved the proposition.
3.3.9 Proof of Proposition 3.7.
F (x; y)
def
= E
h
U

rmin(x; d+ )  
2
y2   y
i
  U(0) (3.40)
We know that by denition
F (x; y)  0 (3.41)
So we have
8><>:
dF (x;y)
dx
= 0
d2F (x;y)
dx2
= 0
(3.42)
=)
8><>: y
0(x) =  F 01
F 02
y00(x) =  F
00
11+F
00
12y
0+(F 0021+F 0022y0)y0
F 02
(3.43)
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It is obviously that there's no cross term in F so we know that
F 0012 = F
00
21 = 0 (3.44)
=)
y00(x) =
F 0011 + F
00
22

F 01
F 02
2
F 02
(3.45)
Since
F 01 =
@
 
E

U
 
rmin(x; d+ )  
2
y2   y
@x
=
Z 

U 0 

r
d (min(x; d+ t))
dx

f(t)dt
=
Z 

U 0   rIft:x<d+tg(t) f(t)dt  0 (3.46)
F 0011 =
@F 01
@x
=
Z 

U 00   rIft:x<d+tg(t)2 f(t)dt  0 (3.47)
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F 02 =
@
 
E

U
 
rmin(x; d+ )  
2
y2   y
@y
=
Z 

U 0 
 
d
  
2
y2   y
dy
!
f(t)dt
=  
Z 

U 0  (y + 1)f(t)dt  0 (3.48)
F 0022 =
@F 02
@y
=  
Z 

  U 00(y + 1)2 + U 0 f(t)dt  0 (3.49)
So
y00(x) =  
F 0011 + F
00
22

F 01
F 02
2
F 02
 0 (3.50)
This proved the proposition.
3.3.10 Proof of Theorem 3.2.
Since the concavity (convexity) of the operational revenue term and auction revenue
term (nancing cost term) are reserved, and the utility function is monotonically
increasing the objective function is concave in x. So the rst order condition gives
the optimal solution.
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3.3.11 Proof of Proposition 3.8.
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.5.
Chapter 4
A Numerical Example
In this chapter we use a numerical example to illustrate the benets of our capacity-
cost sharing scheme and the auction implementation. In our example there're 10 bid-
ders participate in the auction. Buyer's expected demand di are randomly drawn from
U(0:2; 0:8). While their nancial friction i are randomly drawn from U(0:01; 5:00).
The purchasing cost c is set to be 1 and the total revenue r is set to be 2:25. Second-
price sealed auction is implemented in our example. All participants are risk-neutral.
The benets of our capacity-cost sharing scheme is studied in Section 4.1. In Section
4.2 we compare the seller's optimal strategy with an alternative strategy. The buyer's
expected cost share is compared in Section 4.3.
4.1 The Benets of Capacity-Cost Sharing Scheme
We study the benets of our capacity-cost sharing scheme for the seller in this section.
Second-price sealed auction is implemented to select a partner for our shipping rm.
As the alternative scheme the seller will choose not to share the capacity. Under
this scheme the seller will pay all the purchasing cost by its own. We compare the
41
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expected prots for the seller for dierent signals. The result is displayed in Table
4.1.
Table 4.1: The Benets of the Scheme
Signals Expected Prots Benets
d0 0 Share Not Share for Seller
0.20 0.01 0.3028 -0.5550 0.2533
0.20 1.70 0.2737 -1.4000 0.2737
0.20 3.30 0.2465 -2.2000 0.2465
0.20 5.00 0.2180 -3.0500 0.2180
0.40 0.01 0.6486 -1.0500 0.6486
0.40 1.70 0.6031 -0.9500 0.6031
0.40 3.30 0.5628 -1.7500 0.5628
0.40 5.00 0.5219 -2.6000 0.5219
0.60 0.01 0.9142 0.3450 0.5692
0.60 1.70 0.8205 -0.5000 0.8205
0.60 3.30 0.7475 -1.3000 0.7475
0.60 5.00 0.6801 -2.1500 0.6801
0.80 0.01 1.1002 0.7931 0.3071
0.80 1.70 0.9086 -0.5190 0.9086
0.80 3.30 0.7959 -0.8519 0.7959
0.80 5.00 0.7085 -1.7019 0.7085
As observed from Table 4.1 the capacity-cost sharing scheme performs much better
than the alternative non-sharing scheme. Under the non-sharing scheme the shipping
rm's expected prots are negative for most cases. Even the buyer's expected demand
is high (for example d0 = 0:8) its prot could be negative if the nancial friction is
high. This is partially due to the high nancing cost. The rational decision for the
shipping rm is to abort the purchasing plan in this case. However if the shipping
rm adopt our capacity-cost sharing scheme and implement our optimal strategy
its expected prots will be positive for the same signals. The capacity-cost sharing
scheme oers the shipping rm the opportunity to make extra prots by expending
its shipping capacity which it can not aord alone. The last column of Table 4.1
represents the benets of the sharing scheme compared to the non-sharing scheme.
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The benet is signicant for the seller. Buyers can also benet from the sharing
scheme. Since the winning buyer only need to pay the second highest bid level instead
of his winning bid, he will have a positive expected prot from the shared capacity.
4.2 The Benets of Our Optimal Strategy
In this section we will compare the performance of the seller's optimal capacity de-
cision (Strategy A) with an reasonable alternative strategy (Strategy B) under the
capacity-cost sharing scheme.
Strategy A: The percentage xA of capacity to share is determined by Theorem
3.1.
Strategy B: The percentage xB of capacity to share is set to be 1  d0.
Table 4.2: Expected Prots Comparisions
Signals A B (A   B)=B
d0 0 x

A 

A x

B 

B (%)
0.20 0.01 0.6967 0.3028 0.80 0.2533 19.54%
0.20 1.70 0.7023 0.2737 0.80 0.2279 20.10%
0.20 3.30 0.7080 0.2465 0.80 0.2019 20.92%
0.20 5.00 0.7131 0.2180 0.80 0.1783 22.24%
0.40 0.01 0.5527 0.6486 0.60 0.6362 1.94%
0.40 1.70 0.5658 0.6031 0.60 0.5973 0.96%
0.40 3.30 0.5830 0.5628 0.60 0.5606 0.40%
0.40 5.00 0.5921 0.5219 0.60 0.5215 0.08%
0.60 0.01 0.4010 0.9142 0.40 0.9141 0.01%
0.60 1.70 0.4421 0.8205 0.40 0.8079 1.57%
0.60 3.30 0.4712 0.7475 0.40 0.7073 5.69%
0.60 5.00 0.4940 0.6801 0.40 0.6004 13.28%
0.80 0.01 0.2454 1.1002 0.20 1.0889 1.04%
0.80 1.70 0.3451 0.9086 0.20 0.7642 18.89%
0.80 3.30 0.4134 0.7959 0.20 0.4569 74.21%
0.80 5.00 0.4575 0.7085 0.20 0.1303 443.86%
Strategy A adopt our result with the optimal capacity share while Strategy B select
CHAPTER 4. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 44
to sell its expected extra capacity. Notice that expectation is the best estimation for
the future demand from statistical perspective. So if the shipping rm considers
the capacity decision and nancial friction separately it is quite reasonable to adopt
strategy B.
Observed from Table 4.2 strategy A performs much better that strategy B. Espe-
cially when the shipping rm's expected demand is high (d0 = 0:80) or low (d0 = 0:20)
the expected prot of strategy A is 20% higher than strategy B. We can see that when
the the expected demand is low (d0 = 0:2 or 0:4) the seller tends to sell less capacity
than its expected extra capacity. The reason is when x increases buyers will have
more nancial pressure on bidding higher. So the marginal benet from increasing x
decreases. For the opposite case, if the expected demand is high (d0 = 0:60 or 0:80)
the seller tends to sell more than its expected extra capacity. By selling more the
shipping rm can take advantage of buyers' nancial condition and competition.
4.3 Cost Sharing Comparisons
In this section study the expected buyer's cost as a percentage of the total purchasing
cost. We compare the buyer's cost share with its capacity share x. We nd in Table
4.3 that the buyer's share on purchasing cost is larger than its share on the capacity
for all signal combinations in our numerical examples. The dierence between buyer's
cost share and capacity share is signicant. For most cases in our example the gap is
more than 20%. This is a benet of auction. Usually there is sucient negotiation
space between buyer and seller. The nal price is determined by player's power and
information in a bilateral negotiation. But under the scenario of auction buyers are
forced to compete with each other. Auction will push the nal price towards the
winning buyer's bottom line.
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Table 4.3: Cost Share Comparison
d0 0 Cost Share (%) x
 (%) Dierence (%)
0.20 0.01 87.06% 69.67% 17.38%
0.20 1.70 87.26% 70.23% 17.01%
0.20 3.30 87.42% 70.80% 16.62%
0.20 5.00 87.57% 71.31% 16.26%
0.40 0.01 79.53% 55.27% 24.26%
0.40 1.70 80.44% 56.58% 23.86%
0.40 3.30 81.58% 58.30% 23.28%
0.40 5.00 82.15% 59.21% 22.94%
0.60 0.01 65.57% 40.10% 25.47%
0.60 1.70 69.94% 44.21% 25.73%
0.60 3.30 72.78% 47.12% 25.66%
0.60 5.00 74.84% 49.40% 25.44%
0.80 0.01 45.17% 24.54% 20.63%
0.80 1.70 58.94% 34.51% 24.43%
0.80 3.30 66.94% 41.34% 25.60%
0.80 5.00 71.47% 45.75% 25.73%
Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this thesis we studied the risk management problem under the scenario of ship
procurement. We introduced the capacity-cost sharing scheme for this problem. A
general model was established to use auction as the mechanism to select a partner.
We derived the optimal capacity decision for the seller and the equilibrium bidding
strategy for buyers for second-price sealed auction implemented case. All results are
extended to the case that the buyers and seller are risk-averse.
Several assumptions are made in this paper. The private information assumption
we made in the paper is common in auction literatures. And it is an appropriate gen-
eralization. To model the participators' nancial situation by assuming the nancing
cost function c(; z) as the product of the nancial friction  and z
2
2
. This nancing
function is the only continuous function that satises the conditions which is reason-
able for the nancing cost. And this kind of nancing cost function is consist with
Che and Gale (1998). Participators' demands are assumed to be the summation of
the expected demands and noises. We have assumed that the noises are independent
identical distributed, this may be dierent from real world. By our results will not
aect by this assumption. Another critical assumption is that both buyers and the
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seller share the same utility function. Since all participators are playing in the same
industry it is reasonable to assume they have similar opinion on risk issues which is
under our consideration.
The numerical example illustrated the benets of the capacity-cost sharing scheme.
Compared to the non-sharing scheme, the seller will have better chance to make
more prots. For many cases in our example the buyer even can not aord the
vessel purchasing plan without the sharing scheme. Buyers also benet from the
sharing scheme. It oers them an opportunity to expend their shipping capacity for a
reasonable price. Besides, the utilization of the capacity is increased under the sharing
scheme which is considered to be the benet for the society. The implementation
of auction increases the competition among buyers. According to our numerical
example, the expected percentage of cost shared by the winning buyer is signicant
higher that the percentage of capacity it bid for. We also compared the seller's
optimal capacity decision strategy with a reasonable alternative strategy, for which
the seller considers the capacity decision separately with the nancial friction. The
result demonstrate the seller's expected prot will increase signicantly if it adopts
the optimal strategy suggested by this thesis.
There're still a lot of extensions for this project.
(i) The solutions for First-Price Sealed Auction. The uniqueness of the equilibrium
bid function and the concavity of the equilibrium bid level on the capacity share x
are not proved. The equilibrium bid function for multi-dimensional auctions was
considered to be a hard problem in auction research for a long time. The main
diculty is that it is dicult to dene an appropriate order on the multi-dimensional
signals. However for our particular problem structure we can take advantage of isobid
function. It is hopeful that the equilibrium bid function can be developed later.
(ii) Comparisons of the dierences between risk-neutral case and risk-averse case
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for both rst- and second-price auctions are another extension. This is not dicult for
buyer's problem in techniques. We can make some discoveries on the buyer's decision
by comparing the derivatives of their bid functions. However the seller's problem may
be more complicated but our method will still work for that case.
(iii) Comparisons of the dierences between First-Price Sealed Auction and Second-
Price Sealed Auction for both risk-neutral and risk-averse case. The results on these
comparisons are not clear now. Che and Gale (1998) developed a method to do such
kind comparisons. We'll try to compare our results to theirs if the First-Price Sealed
Auction is solved.
(iv) Our capacity-cost sharing scheme can be applied to many other problem
concerning with manufacturing and service capacity decision problems.
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